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Tom Hazlett interviews Friedrich A. Hayek


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Focusing on the political implications of Hayek's ideas, Thomas Hazlett explores the position of governments in contemporary times. The development of government as a spontaneous process with respect to the role of judges is explained. The errors in the Constitution of the USA are described. The bifurcation in classical liberal thought is described. Hayek describes implications of the democratic welfare state on the future state of the law, as well as the concepts of social justice and egalitarianism. The division of legislative power is the key to ensuring that no special privileges are granted. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's thoughts on political processes, the idea of referendums and the recent ascendency of Hayek’s thoughts in the court of public opinion are all discussed.


Interview with Friedrich A. Hayek by Tom Hazlett
Thanks to Pacific Academy Advanced Studies for permission to distribute this program.

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Digitization: Mario Estrada, Jorge Samayoa; content analysis and synopsis: Alex Weller; content reviser: Daphne Ortiz; publication: Rebeca Zuñiga

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HAZLETT: Among contemporary social philosophers, I think it's safe to say that you have pursued the idea of a spontaneous order the furthest.  I'd like to ask: What is the litmus test for deciding whether some specific action of government is part of a spontaneous order, [as opposed to] an attempt to impose a solution by construction? 
HAYEK: I think [it depends on] whether the government merely enforces abstract rules of conduct or makes people serve particular concrete ends.  The enforcement of abstract rules of conduct, in the sense in which a general law is equally applicable to all, only determines the formation of a type of structure, without deciding anything about the purpose at which men ought to aim.  If men are told what end to serve, it's no longer a spontaneous order; it becomes an organization serving a particular purpose. 
HAZLETT: Now, you give the Roman constitution as an example, within a legal setting, of a spontaneous evolutionary process; yet at any particular time during the period when the Roman constitution was developed, it was certainly imposed upon the citizens.  Isn't this type of situation a paradox? 
HAYEK: No, you see, I think it's not appropriate to speak of a Roman constitution at all.  The form of government was changing all through the process, and the constitution was a method of determining the organization of government.  I was speaking about the evolution of private law, which under the Roman tradition, determines the extent of the coercive powers of government.  And this law developed, in that sense, spontaneously.  
The judges tried to articulate, in words and judgments, moral conceptions which had gradually grown up, constantly improving them, and even modifying them, in order to make them internally more consistent.  
It was a process of growth like this, of what essentially is a system of rules of individual conduct, which as tradition made people accept as the limitations of governmental power over-- I can't say the individual; I must say the free individual, because you had a large population of slaves, which was not included.  
As far as the free citizen of Rome was affected for, say, the first 300 years since Christ--the classical period of the Roman Empire--you could say that the powers of government were effectively reduced to what is my ideal, because it was the spontaneously developed system of rules of conduct which was all that government could enforce, apart from taxation, which I will leave out for the present moment. 
HAZLETT: What mistakes, in terms of the available state of knowledge, did the authors of the United States Constitution make? 
HAYEK: Oh, in entrusting both the function of government and the function of legislation, in the true sense, to a single body--in fact, two houses of Congress--which both can lay down rules of conduct and instruct government what to do.  Once you have this situation, you no longer have government under the law, because those who govern can make for themselves whatever law they like. 
HAZLETT: Many theorists have commented that your writings--political philosophy--are much more in the tradition of James Madison than they are in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson. 
HAYEK: Perfectly correct. 
HAZLETT: What differences do you perceive along these lines? 
HAYEK: Oh, Madison was essentially concerned in limiting government; Jefferson was much more concerned in making government do good. 
HAZLETT: In The Constitution of Liberty, you chart the divergence of liberalism in the nineteenth century into a libertarian wing and a socialist wing.  Of course, in the twentieth century the socialist wing has been overwhelmingly dominant, but is it possible at this late date, however, that liberalism is again splitting into two schools, and that now we are seeing the reemergence of a classical liberal tradition?  
HAYEK: I hope so.  Among the young people, certainly, in the last five or ten years, this has been springing up, not only in the United States but also on the European continent.  And in the last few months, even in France, a country which I thought was least hopeful, a group of young people who are libertarians with a well-founded intellectual argument [have been] appreciating the points we have just been discussing--that the power of government should be limited, on the one hand, to enforcing rules of individual conduct, and, on the other hand, without coercive powers, rendering certain services.  
I like to say that when I was very young, only very old people still believed in that kind of liberalism; when I was in my middle age, nobody except myself and perhaps [Ludwig von] Mises believed in it; and now I've lived long enough to find the thing is being rediscovered by the young.  That makes me fairly optimistic, not for the near future, because it would take twenty years or so before these young people will have any power; but my other phrase is that if we survive the next twenty years--if the politicians don't destroy civilization--I think there is good hope for mankind. 
HAZLETT: Along those lines about how possible it is to turn back the flood of government regulation, in California we've seen a massive groundswell of opinion on this thing called Proposition 13; yet now it seems that this taxcutting measure will leave as a chief legacy, besides cutting property taxes, the imposition of rent controls in many parts of the state of California.  It seems that the dynamics of the welfare state are very much involved in this.  Do you think that it really is possible to turn back the tide? 
HAYEK: I hope so.  I am by no means certain, but I devote all my efforts-- My concern is to operate on public opinion, in the hope that public opinion will sufficiently change to make such a development possible.  But if I may say so--I hope you are not offended--I don't believe the ultimate decision is with America.  
You are too unstable in your opinion, and if opinion has been turning in the right direction the last few years, it may be turning in the wrong direction again in the next few years.  While it's sometimes a great advantage to be able to change opinion very rapidly, it also creates a certain amount of instability.  I think it must become a much more general movement, and for that reason, I am rather more hopeful about what is happening among the young people in Europe nowadays than what's happening here, perhaps also because in Europe the intellectual tendencies are more likely to capture public opinion lastingly.  
While though at present you have an equally promising group of young intellectuals in this country, it does not mean that in ten years' time they will have gained public opinion. 
HAZLETT: Do you have any examples in mind of countries that, once having flirted with socialism or the welfare state, have been able to reinstitute the rule of law? 
HAYEK: Oh, very clearly Germany after World War II, although in that case it was really the achievement of a single man almost. 
HAZLETT: Ludwig Erhard.
HAYEK: Ludwig Erhard, yes. 
HAZLETT: Let's take a look at the spontaneous order idea in terms of a specific issue.  In this country the affirmative action program has to do with racial quotas. 
HAYEK: Explain to me what it means.  I've never really understood what "affirmative action" is supposed to mean. 
HAZLETT: Well, it's founded on the argument that if the government treats everyone equally now, in terms of race, that it will implicitly be sanctioning past discrimination.  Hence, it is necessary for the state to take so-called affirmative action, and for private employers to take affirmative action, in hiring minorities and groups that the government classifies as having been discriminated  against, and favoring them over groups that have been classified as not having been discriminated against. 
HAYEK: Achieve nondiscrimination by discrimination. 
HAZLETT: Well, that's exactly the question that has been posed by this.  But the question is, from your political philosophy, doesn't the spontaneous order idea, which is to let things work themselves out, inherently favor or inherently bias, let's say, the outcome in favor of past discriminations or past inequities? 
HAYEK: It accepts historical accidents.  But after all, civilization rests on the fact that people are very different, both in their location and their gifts and their interests, and unless we allow these differences to exist irrespective of whether we in the particular case think they are desirable or not, I think we shall stop the whole process of evolution.  
After all, the present civilization rests on the fact that some people have settled in places which are not very conducive to their welfare, some people have been moving to parts of the world where conditions are not very good, and that we are using this great variety of opportunities, which means-- Variety of opportunities means always difference of opportunities.  
I think if you try to make the opportunities of all people equal you eliminate the main stimulus to evolution.  Let me say what I wanted to say a moment ago.  What you explained to me about the meaning of affirmative action is the same dilemma which egalitarianism achieves: in order to make people equal you have to treat them differently.  If you treat people, so far as government is concerned, alike, the result is necessarily inequality; you can have either freedom and inequality, or unfreedom and equality. 
HAZLETT: I'd like to go to a different line of thought.  Many philosophers right now, and economists, are concerned with the bias of democracy towards big government.  The idea is that subsidies which go to powerful special interests, which are very specific, and the taxes and higher prices that are caused by the costs of government programs, are diffused over a wide audience of consumers and taxpayers, so that it is in the interest of the lobbies of special interests to go ahead and spend money to get these favors from the state; whereas it's not in the interest of consumers and taxpayers to organize on one specific issue.  
Now, this is somewhat different than your reasoning about the growth of government in The Road to Serfdom, and the intellectuals and socialism, in that you basically attribute the rise of big government to a misunderstanding or a mistake--that socialism really does not deliver what it promises.  And here these people are saying that actually the tendency towards big government is a rational process in the sense that people act in their own self-interest.  How do you reconcile these two views? 
HAYEK: Well, they are two different things, but which operate in the same direction.  So far as people act under socialist influence, they work in-- What I did not fully understand at that time is that the democratic process, quite apart from socialist ideology, has the same tendency.  
I should strictly say the "unlimited democracy," because unlimited democracy is not guided by the agreement of a majority but is guided by the necessity of buying the support of a sufficient number of small groups to form a majority.  It's a very different thing.  
The original conception of democracy was that people actually agreed on governmental action, and it was assumed that on each issue there was a majority view and a minority view.  The fact is, of course, that the thing doesn't work that way.  You have to build up a majority, which then acts.  And you build up a majority and count on the present system of unlimited powers of the government only to grant special privileges to a sufficient number of small groups.  
Now, that is not a thing I had clearly seen at the time of writing The Road to Serfdom, but it is the main theme of the present book I'm now publishing, of which the final volumes are in the press and coming out early next year.  
I think that so long as we have a so-called democratic or representative legislature, which at the same time can legislate and govern, we no longer have a limited government but rather a government which, because it is unlimited, is forced to grant an ever-increasing number of special privileges to particular groups.  What originally democracy aimed at is only possible in a limited democracy, where government is under the law and where therefore two different bodies must be concerned in laying down the law, on the one hand, and operating under that law, on the other. 
HAZLETT: Institutionally, how does separating these two different legislative functions make it more difficult for special interests to influence legislation?  Don't lobbyists then just have to buy two lunches? 
HAYEK: Well, no, certain things become wholly impossible.  If you can use coercion only in the execution of general rules, certain things are completely impossible.  
Government just would not have the power to grant special privileges, and that will become clear if the thing has to be spelled out.  My truly legislative assembly could only lay down general rules equally applicable to all, and the other could only coerce in enforcing these rules; the second wouldn't have the power to do more, nor would have the first.  Now, to preserve this, you would have, in a third instance, a truly constitutional court, which would decide what one could do, what the other could do, and what nobody could do.  But I think this combination could, in the long run, fully achieve what I aim at, provided that they are elected on quite different principles.  I must explain that later. 
On conditions, it is really possible, as I believe the nineteenth century rightly believed it to be possible, to draw sharp logical distinctions between what are general rules of law and what are specific commands.  
I am not claiming that we have solved all the problems involved there; in fact, that would be the task of my constitutional court gradually to elaborate this.  But the nineteenth century had actually evolved a definition of law in what they called the "material sense" of the word, in contrast to the purely "formal sense," as a general rule applicable to an unknown number of future instances, referring only to individual conduct, with one or two more qualifications like this.  That and our present knowledge seems to be a pretty adequate definition, although I'm not sure that in practical cases it would always suffice.  But that's a typical task of a court; if the principle is laid down, the court can work it out. 
HAZLETT: As an advocate of a really revolutionary reform, in terms of our governmental structure, don't you run the risk of being accused of being a constructionist or a rationalist? 
HAYEK: No.  I'm quite sure this has to be gradually achieved, once the ideal is recognized, and institutions have of course to be designed, even if they develop.  I only object against the whole thing made to singly designed institutions.  Our spontaneous order of society is made up of a great many organizations, in a technical sense, and within an organization design is needed.  And that some degree of design is even needed in the framework within which this spontaneous order operates, I would always concede; I have no doubt about this.  
Of course, here it gets into a certain conflict with some of the modern anarchists, but I believe there is one convincing argument why you can't leave even the law to voluntary evolution: the great society depends on your being able to expect that any stranger you encounter in a given territory will obey the same system of rules of law.  
Otherwise you would be confined to people whom you know.  And the conception of some of our modern anarchists that you can have one club which agrees on one law, another club [agrees on another law], would make it just impossible to deal with any stranger.  So in a sense you have, at least for a given territory, a uniform law, and that can only exist if it's enforced by government.  So the only qualification you must have is that the law must consist of abstract rules equally applicable to all, for an unknown number of future instances and so on.  
HAZLETT: If the spontaneous order has a beneficial effect on legal institutions, would the United States, for instance, be better off just to abolish the federal government and to have fifty state governments try different institutions? 
HAYEK: What I would favor, in a case like this, is to have a common law in my sense of general rules, but devolve practically all governmental functions to smaller units.  I dream of all governmental functions performed by local units competing with each other for citizens. 
HAZLETT: You mentioned before that libertarian political movements are springing up in this country and in Europe.  What major differences do you perceive between your philosophy and the idea of a spontaneous order and the libertarians, who in many cases are nearer anarchism in their philosophy? 
HAYEK: Well, of course, I can't generalize about this, because within this large number you have everything from pure anarchists to people who are much too interventionist for me; so I would be somewhere in the middle of that group. 
HAZLETT: You have written almost alone on the subject, in The Constitution of Liberty, of the separation of the concept of value and the concept of merit--that good people don't "deserve" more money but that, in the economic system, people get money for a lot of reasons that we can't even describe.  And this is a subtle point.  I don't know if libertarians, even people that agree with your political conclusions, have caught on to this.  Do you find that this point is being missed? 
HAYEK: I think it has been missed, and when I put it in The Constitution of Liberty, I even followed it up to its ultimate conclusion.  
I think it's all a matter of the basic difference between the attitudes we developed in the closed, face-to-face society and the modern, abstract society.  The idea of merit is an idea of our appreciation of known other persons in the small group--what is commonly called the face-to-face society; while in the greater open society, in apparent terms, we must be guided purely by abstract considerations, and merit cannot come in.  Incidentally, this is a point which, curiously enough, has been seen by Immanuel Kant.  He puts it perfectly clearly--yes, I think he uses the equivalent of merit--that merit cannot be a matter of general rule. 
HAZLETT: Of course, in society as a whole the social justice concept is still quite prevalent, and there are even many very popular philosophers who advocate that any sort of good fortune or luck that is economically beneficial to individuals be taxed away.  
HAYEK: Well, it's absolutely essential that individuals are making use of luck, and if it's no longer worthwhile to pursue pure luck, very desirable things will be left out.  I think the old concept of social justice is a misconception in the sense that a conception which applies to individual conduct only is applied to a spontaneous process which nobody directs, and in fact the concept is wholly empty, because no two people can agree what social justice would be. 
HAZLETT: What do you make of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's criticism of Western society? 
HAYEK: I'm a little puzzled by it.  I'm a great admirer of Solzhenitsyn, but my interpretation [of his criticism] was [that it must have been the result of] just shock by too great a difference between what he had known and was familiar with and what he experiences in the United States--the politics, the many peculiar features of the United States that are essential to a free society.  
I was not greatly impressed by this; in fact, I was a little disillusioned in my admiration for Solzhenitsyn when he came out with that statement, although in a way it is a good illustration of one of my main points.  Namely, that civilization disagrees with a great many of our innate instincts, and most of the people haven't reconciled themselves with that fact.  Civilization has certain costs and involves certain constant disappointments of what we call natural needs.  
Solzhenitsyn is still a man who relies a great deal on natural instincts, and to discover that there are so many natural instincts which the advanced civilization does not satisfy oppresses him.  So I can understand it, but I don't think his argument is compatible with the argument for a free society. 
HAZLETT: He has objected, of course, to the hedonism and lack of responsibility that is found in a free society.  Is it simply a product of him having very little experience in a free society that this bothers him so much? 
HAYEK: Well, it bothers him more, but of course he shares it with so many of our own philosophers that it can't be surprising, really.  
It's shocking [coming from] a man who has been protesting so loudly against the extreme form of tyranny, but when you reflect upon it, you must almost expect it in his situation.  That he should come to the resignation at which somebody has arrived who has studied for a long time the extent to which to achieve civilization we had to renounce many of our natural instincts, you cannot really expect from a man whose whole concern has been that his natural instincts have been oppressed by that system.  That even civilization requires restraints on natural instincts he has not yet discovered. 
HAZLETT: Looking at the Russian dissidents, who certainly face a heroic battle in our time vis-a-vis the concept of liberty, are you disappointed by the lack of libertarianism in some of their thoughts? 
HAYEK: Emotionally, perhaps; intellectually, no.  I understand too well that this is almost an inevitable situation.  We admire these people for what they dislike, but that they have not a clear idea of what would be desirable is so little surprising that we ought really not to be upset by it.  One is naturally upset if a man with whom one feels he's been agreeing all the time suddenly turns, like Solzhenitsyn, against Western civilization.  It comes as a shock, but in fact psychologically nothing is more natural than that. 
HAZLETT: Of course, it might be disappointing that somebody as brilliant as a Solzhenitsyn has as difficult a time understanding the principles of a liberal society as he does.  So that might cause some consternation. 
HAYEK: It naturally does.  But, you know, when you turn to modern Western literature, there's very little chance of finding a satisfactory explanation of the workings of Western society.  And I must say, I was a little apprehensive when I heard that Solzhenitsyn was moving to America and probably getting in the hands of American intellectuals--not scholars but the makers of opinion, who are fundamentally not the most sensible people you can wish for. 
HAZLETT: Going back to the intellectual reversion in Western society, let's take a look at Europe.  Where do you feel the brightest currents are coming from? 
HAYEK: Well, I only know really about three countries now: England, Germany, and France.  I think it began really in Germany, with a very small group, at first at the university where I finally taught and am now living--Freiburg.  They influenced Erhard, and for a time in the fifties and sixties, a small group of German intellectuals were leading.  There is now a similar development in England, which in a way is perhaps intellectually more founded, largely turning round a single institution, the Institute of Economic Affairs [IEA], which has pursued the very sensible policy of not so much talking about general principles but illustrating them by investigating one particular issue after another in detail.  Extremely well done.  [There is] a French movement of very recent date; I only learned about it last summer.  
There are now half a dozen young French economists who think like the so-called Austrians in this country, and like most of these English people or the Freiburg [people] or the social-market-economy school in Germany.  I found this so encouraging because I always felt that the French situation was the most hopeless.  And that there should be, from the intellectual end, a reaction I think is more promising than almost anything else.  I can never generalize about Italy; I don't know what's happening there.  There are some extreme individualists and some extreme so-called communists, but both seem, when you analyze it, to be really anarchists. 
HAZLETT: Now, going back to France, the so-called new philosophers have received an enormous amount of publicity in France and internationally.  What do you perceive their value as? 
HAYEK: They are very muddled, really.  My hope is for not a nouveau philosophe but a nouveau économiste, which is a distinct group and which in fact is criticizing the nouveaux philosophes
HAZLETT: On what grounds? 
HAYEK: On having still retained much too much of the socialist preconceptions.  The new philosophers are merely disappointed with Russia and the Russian doctrine; they still imagine that you can preserve the idealist element behind it and only avoid the excesses of the communist parties.  On the fundamentals, they do not think very differently.  They are essentially people who have been disillusioned with one idea, but have not yet a clear conception of an alternative.  But apparently these new young economists really believe in a libertarian system. 
HAZLETT: Why have the liberals lost in Germany?  Why are they no longer influential, as they once were? 
HAYEK: Well, I think, with the usual rules of the parliamentary system in which they function, they realize that with the present type of democracy, government is inevitably driven into intervention, even against its professed principles.  It's always the sort of cynicism of people who still believe it would be nice if we could stick to our liberal principles, but it proves in practice to be impossible.  So they resign themselves reluctantly, and perhaps some more cynically.  They believe other people are getting out things from the process of corruption; so they decide to participate in it.  It's quite cynical. 
HAZLETT: Well, so what does a politician do?  You just wrote a foreword for a book by a former secretary of the treasury, William Simon.   A Time for Truth, which became a best-seller in this country, is very widely read now.  What would a Bill Simon, a secretary of the treasury, do under those political constraints? 
HAYEK: Well, I'm afraid so long as we retain the present form of unlimited democracy, all we can hope for is to slow down the process, but we can't reverse it.  I am pessimistic enough to be convinced that unless we change our constitutional structure, we are going to be driven on against people's wishes deeper and deeper into government control.  It is in the nature of our political system, which has now become quite as bad in the United States as anywhere else.  What we have got now is in name democracy but is not a system in which it is the opinion of the majority which governs, but instead where the government is forced to serve a sufficient number of special interests to get a majority. 
HAZLETT: A political tactic that has just developed very recently in this country on the part of libertarians, and Milton Friedman has certainly been a leader here, is this idea of the referendum--Proposition 13, obviously, was the case in point--to allow people as a whole to vote against, in general, big government.  That seems to be the tactic now.  Do you think that this really has-- 
HAYEK: It's not the ultimate solution, but it may not only delay or slow down the process; it may do even more.  It may affect opinions in the right direction.  
People may come to understand what the trouble is.  So I'm all in favor of it, particularly since I have been watching the thing operating in Switzerland, where again and again referendums stopped action which the politicians believed they had to take in order to satisfy the majority.  Then it turned out when they asked the majority that the majority turned them down.  It happened so frequently in Switzerland that I became convinced that this is a very useful brake on bad features of our present-time democracy.  I don't think it's a longtime solution, but it might give a sufficiently long pause for the public to appreciate what the dangers are. 
HAZLETT: You mention the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) as having tremendous influence in Britain.  Is this really the solution, to stimulate intellectual discourse from a free-market standpoint? 
HAYEK: Oh, I'm sure you can't operate any other way.  You have to persuade the intellectuals, because they are the makers of public opinion.  It's not the people who really understand things; it's the people who pick up what is fashionable opinion.  You have to make the fashionable opinion among the intellectuals before journalism and the schools and so on will spread it among the people at large.  I oughtn't to praise them because the suggestion of the Institute came from me originally; so I let them on the job, but I'm greatly pleased that they are so successful. 
HAZLETT: So if a businessman says to you, "What can I do?" from the state down, your suggestion is to send a check to the IEA or a reasonable facsimile. 
HAYEK: Oh, yes.  Of course, do the same thing here.  In fact, the man who has founded, on my advice, the London Institute is now creating similar institutes in this country, in Los Angeles and San Francisco and New York, and he has already done one in Vancouver, which is nearly as good as the London one. 
HAZLETT: The Fraser Institute, I think you're referring to. 
HAYEK: Yes. 
HAZLETT: Earlier this year the London Times captioned your photograph with the title "F. A. Hayek, the greatest economic philosopher of the age."  I daresay that twenty years ago, you would have been given a different title. 
HAYEK: Oh, very definitely; yes. 
HAZLETT: In your mind, what is the reason for the respect that your ideas are currently garnering, when so recently they met with open hostility? 
HAYEK: Well, I think the main point is the decline of the reputation of [John Maynard] Keynes.  Thirty years ago there were two-- I may sound curious myself saying this, but I believe about 1946, when Keynes died, Keynes and I were the best-known economists.  
Then two things happened: Keynes died and was raised to sainthood; and I discredited myself by publishing The Road to Serfdom.  And that changed the situation completely.  For the following thirty years, it was only Keynes who counted, and I was gradually almost forgotten.  Now the failure of the Keynesian system--inflation, the return of unemployment, all that--first confirmed my predictions in strictly the economic sphere.  At the same time, my studies of politics provided, I believe, answers for many problems which had begun to bother people very seriously.  There is a good reason why I am being rediscovered, so to speak. 
HAZLETT: Well, if Keynes were alive today, how different do you think the political climate would be? 
HAYEK: I think very likely it would be very different.  Keynes was very capable of rapidly changing his opinion.  In fact, he was already, when I talked to him the last time, very critical of his pupils who in the postwar period were still agitating for inflation; and he assured me that if his ideas would ever become dangerous, he would turn public opinion around in a moment.  Six weeks later he was dead and couldn't do it.  
But I wouldn't dare to say what his development would have been; he had been so much an intuitive genius, not really a strict logical reasoner, that both the atmosphere of the time, the needs of the moment, and his personal feelings might have swayed his opinions very much.  I regard him as a real genius, but not as a great economist, you know.  He's not a very consistent or logical thinker, and he might have developed in almost any direction.  The only thing I am sure is that he would have disapproved of what his pupils made of his doctrines. 
HAZLETT: Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracywas written just two years before your The Road to Serfdom.  What influence did Schumpeter's book have on you? 
HAYEK: None, because my book was practically ready before his came out.  You see, I rewrote and rewrote for stylistic reasons, but the whole argument was on paper before Schumpeter's book came out. 
HAZLETT: Are you optimistic about the survival of freedom? 
HAYEK: Not very.  I think I said so before in this conversation that if the politicians do not destroy civilization in the next twenty years, there's good hope but I am by no means certain that they shan't succeed in destroying it before then. 
HAZLETT: So the long run is positive but the short run looks bleak.
HAZLETT: Thank you very much.
Dock windowTable of Contents
Government versus spontaneous order
Mistakes in the US Constitution
Proposition 13
Affirmative action
Public choice theory
Special interests
Hayek, a constructionist?
Modern libertarianism
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Intellectuals in modern Europe
Unlimited democracy
Keynes versus Hayek
Influence of Joseph Schumpeter in The Road to Serfdom
Final words
Final credits
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